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4 Behavioral economics, 
neuroeconomics, and identity 
John B. Davis l 
1 Introduction 
Behavioral economics originated largely as a cntIque of neoclassical 
thinking about rationality and individual preferences. Largely overlooked by 
the proponents of this critique is the fact that preferences constitute the 
basis on which the personal identity of the individual may be understood in 
neoclassical theory, and thus that the behavioral critique has implications for 
how we might think about personal identity in economics. Moreover, since 
the implicit account of personal identity in neoclassical theory in terms of 
preferences is circular and empty (Davis 2003), and since some account of 
personal identity is ultimately necessary to be able to talk about individuals 
in economics, also overlooked is the question: Does behavioral economics, in 
addition to what it offers for thinking about rationality and choice, offer a 
secure foundation for thinking about personal identity to fill the gap left by 
neoclassical theory? Alternatively, might it rather be the case that behavioral 
economics makes no improvement on the neoclassical account of individual 
identity, and thus follows neoclassical theory in begging the question of 
what makes individuals individual in economics? In light of these questions, 
it is interesting not only that cognitive psychology, from which behavioral 
economics is drawn, possesses a widely shared view of what constitutes 
personal identity, but that this view involves a reinterpretation of the very 
same philosophical foundations that underlie the unsuccessful neoclassical 
view of identity, namely John Locke's understanding of identity in terms of 
memory. Can Locke's memory view of identity, then, be taken up and rein-
terpreted in behavioral economics in such a way as to escape the problems 
that arise in connection with neoclassical theory? 
Here I first argue that cognitive psychology's adaptation of Locke's view 
offers behavioral economics an escape from one difficulty inherent in the 
neoclassical account, but that as a purely cognitive theory it still leaves unre-
solved another difficulty as an account of identity. However, just as cognitive 
psychology has employed neuropsychology as one route of development, so 
an increasingly influential route of development for behavioral economics is 
neuroeconomics, understood as the combination of neuroscience and behav-
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ioral theory (cf. Camerer et al. 2005). Thus, second, I argue that the rela-
tively recent interest on the part of behavioralists and experimentalists in 
neuroeconomics represents a possible further step toward developing an 
alternative account of personal identity. This further step, moreover, goes to 
the heart of the neuroeconomics program, and thus evaluating it as a 
possible step in developing an account of personal identity provides insights 
both into the status of individuals in a revised preference approach to choice 
and rationality and also into the prospects for developing neuropsycholog-
ical foundations for economics. 
Section 2 briefly summarizes the emergence of behavioral economics as a 
set of critiques of neoclassical thinking about preferences and rationality, 
emphasizing what has been termed alternative or nonconventional 
approaches within non-expected utility theory, and then comments on how 
this development bears on thinking about individual identity in terms of 
preferences. Section 3 explains how personal identity is understood in cogni-
tive psychology on the self-as-memory view, and distinguishes this approach 
from Locke's account of identity in terms of memory. Section 4 looks at 
how behavioral and experimental economics have inadvertently come upon 
the self-as-memory conception of the individual, reviews Vernon Smith's 
ideas on the subject as a particularly clear expression of this thinking, and 
argues that this conception still leaves one key problem unaddressed. Section 
5 turns to neuroeconomics' conception of the individual as a potential 
further step in the self-as-memory view, considers what it might assume 
about the relationship between mind and brain, and then compares this view 
to a similar view advanced by Derek Parfit in his analysis of personal iden-
tity. Section 6 briefly introduces social psychology as a framework for 
additionally enlarging the neuroeconomics conception of the identity of the 
individual as applied to economics and law. 
2 The behavioral economics critique of preferences 
Though behavioral economics involves a wide and diverse set of critiques of 
the descriptive and normative adequacy of standard expected utility theory, 
over time these critiques have reflected less and less optimism as to whether 
standard expected utility theory can be retained as a general framework for 
understanding rationality and choice. In early contributions - for example 
Maurice Allais's (1953) discovery of common consequence and common 
ratio effects at odds with expected utility theory's independence axiom, or 
the evidence of preference reversals showing how orderings can depend on 
preference elicitation procedures (Lichtenstein and Siovic 1971) - the 
emphasis generally rested on seeing violations of the standard framework as 
anomalies, and then on revising the standard framework so as to be able to 
accommodate them in a more general theory. Thus, according to Chris 
Starmer, as a result of the accumulation of considerable evidence contra-
dicting the independence axiom in particular: 
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a wave of theories designed to explain the evidence began to emerge 
at the end of the 1970s. Most of these theories have the following 
features in common: (i) preferences are represented by some function 
V(.) defmed over individual prospects; (ii) the function satisfies ordering 
and continuity; and (iii) while V(.) is designed to permit observed viola-
tions of the independence axiom, the principle of monotonicity is 
retained. 
(Starmer 2000: 337) 
Starmer calls "theories with these properties conventional theories," and 
states that the "general spirit of the approach is to seek 'well behaved' theo-
ries of preference preserving monotonicity that are nonetheless consistent 
with observed violations of independence" (Starmer 2000: 337-38). In order 
to deal with the disconfirming empirical evidence, then, in time-honored 
instrumentalist fashion the conventional approach "models choice as prefer-
ence maximization and assumes that agents behave as if optimizing some 
underlying preference function .. . [though] there is no-presupposition that 
the model corresponds with any of the mental activities actually involved in 
making choices" (Starmer 2000: 349). 
Others, however, saw abandoning descriptive adequacy as inconsistent 
with the general goal of providing more realistic explanations of choice 
under risk, and by the end of the decade what Starmer calls a nonconven-
tional approach had emerged that proposed alternatives to standard theory 
rather than attempting to revise it. The most influential of these alternative 
theories was prospect theory, developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky in what became one of the most highly cited articles in 
Econometrica (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In general, nonconventional 
theories depart from the traditional framework by adding a procedural element 
to choice behavior in supposing that individuals rely on decision heuristics 
or rules sensitive to context to frame their choices.2 Thus in prospect theory 
choice is a two-phase process, with prospects "edited" in the first phase using 
different decision heuristics, and choices then made in the second phase 
from a restricted or reformulated class of prospects. 
This two-phase process reflects the distinction made in the psychology 
subfield of behavioral decision research between investigation of judgment 
processes, which people use to estimate probabilities, and choice processes, 
which people use to select among actions given their judgments (Camerer 
and Loewenstein 2003). The two-phase analysis makes it possible to look at 
gains and losses relative to reference points and ultimately introduce well-
observed phenomena at odds with standard framework predictions such as 
diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). 
More generally, prospect theory opens the door to the investigation of a 
variety of descriptive and procedure invariance failures that cast doubt on 
the traditional idea that individuals possess stable and coherent preferences. 
Taken as a whole, then, the "one feature common" to all nonconventional 
theories that distinguishes them from those approaches meant to preserve a 
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revised standard expected utility framework is that "none of them can be 
reduced to, or expressed purely in terms of, a single preference function 
V(.)" (Starmer 2000: 339). 
Thus, what appears to have occurred over the course of several decades in 
behavioral research is that the search for an alternative theory of choice 
under risk has gradually become an increasingly important if not the main 
objective of researchers in place of the original goal of repairing standard 
expected utility theory. One reflection of this is that researchers refer less to 
experimental results as violations and anomalies, and now consider the possi-
bility that standard expected utility theory is more likely a special case 
within a more general alternative theory rather than a general theory itself. 
However, more may be involved than simply a change in focus if, as Starmer 
puts it, an increasing number of behavioral researchers are willing to assume 
that individual choice under risk cannot be explained in terms of a single 
preference function, since it is not clear that approaches which abandon this 
assumption fall into the same class as those that maintain it. Indeed, since 
having a single preference function is the way in which individuals are 
defined in neoclassical theory, supposing that choice cannot be explained in 
such terms raises the issue of whether behavioral economics (at least the 
nonconventional approaches) fundamentally departs from the neoclassical 
theory of the individual, and thus constitutes a significantly different 
approach to understanding individuals. 
This deeper issue has been closer to the surface than it may initially seem 
in the form of a debate between behavioralists and experimentalists over the 
character of preferences consequent upon assuming the two-phase analysis 
of choice. Thus, on the one hand, those on the nonconventionalist side suppose 
that preferences are not the indifference curves of textbooks, but are highly 
malleable and dependent on the context in which they are elicited (Camerer 
and Loewenstein 2003), so that choice involves processes whereby individ-
uals effectively "construct" their preferences (Payne et at. 1992; Slovic 1995). 
On the other hand, those likely to be conventionalists hold the "discovered 
preference hypothesis," a term coined by Charles Plott (1996), which 
assumes that individuals have coherent and stable preferences, though they 
are not necessarily always revealed in their decisions, but can be "discov-
ered" to underlie their apparent preferences after individuals engage in 
information gathering, deliberation, and trial-and-error learning. Proponents 
of the "discovered preference hypothesis," we might thus say, depart from 
the instrumentalist "as if" view in saying that individuals have a single pref-
erence function V(.) but that it is descriptively available only under the 
correct experimental procedures. While this shifts the debate away from the 
merits of instrumentalist reasoning regarding individuals to a consideration 
of the experimental controls needed to avoid confounding effects associated 
with laboratory subjects failing to act consistently with their underlying 
preferences, there are good reasons to suppose that it does not succeed in 
rescuing the conventionalist view (cf. Cilbitt et al. 2001). 
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Where, then, does this leave thinking about the individual? If we are to 
assess behavioral economics as a whole, what we fmd is a general retreat 
from the neoclassical conception in the case of nonconventionalist 
approaches, together with a set of defenses of the traditional single prefer-
ence function V(.) basis for the individual in the case of conventionalist 
approaches that has gained an at best limited success. In neoclassical theory 
the traditional axiomatic treatment of preferences permits assigning the 
individual a single utility function, which allows for an account of the 
personal identity of the individual (albeit faulty) in terms of the notion of 
"own" preferences. However, this prospective foundation for identity ceases 
to be even an issue if it is not even possible to say that individuals possess a 
single preference function V(.) in the first place. The important question, it 
thus seems, is what account of the individual and personal identity might be 
put forward by the nonconventionalists, who have not been reluctant to 
entirely cut the umbilical cord to the traditional neoclassical basis for under-
standing individuals in terms of preferences. As no such alternative account 
appears yet to have been fully worked out, the following section turns to the 
resources naturally available for one in the treatment of the individual and 
personal identity developed by cognitive psychologists. 
3 Cognitive psychology and personal identity in terms of memory 
Cognitive psychologists investigate individuals apart from their interactions 
with other individuals, focus on their mental representations, and regard 
individuals' mental representations as being either perception-based or . 
meaning-based. The self is understood in terms of two kinds of mental 
representations which individuals can have of themselves: perception-based 
self-images and meaning-based self-concepts (Kililstrom and Klein 1994). 
Since individuals have memories of their self-images and self-concepts, over 
time the self may be identifled with the individual's collection of remem-
bered self-images and self-concepts, and accordingly cognitive psychologists 
have explained the self in terms of memory, and characterized the self as 
one's memory for oneself (Klein 2001). 
The well-known antecedent for the view that identity is based on memory 
is Locke's defmition of personal identity as continuity in one's own memo-
ries (Locke 1975 [1694]). Philosophers generally regard Locke's defmition as 
an inadequate explanation of personal identity on the grounds of its being 
circular (cf. Perry 1975). The self cannot be explained in terms of its remem-
bering its own memories since this presupposes that which is to be explained. 
Cognitive psychologists, however, are not interested in how individuals 
might be seen to construct their own personal identities through what they 
remember about what they believe to be their own past experiences, but are, 
rather, interested in how third-party social scientists might attribute identity 
to individuals in terms of observed memory reports expressed by those indi-
viduals, irrespective of whether those reports accurately recall individuals' 
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past experiences. In effect, cognitive psychologists make use of an alternative 
concept of memory essentially like the one developed by philosophers to 
overcome Locke's circularity problem, namely quasi-memory or q-memory 
(parfit 1984), that only requires that an individual's memory seem to that 
individual to have been his or her memory, whether or not it in fact was.3 
Individuals are then identified in terms of their real memories and perhaps 
"false" memories, as observed by cognitive psychologists. This strategy 
escapes Locke's circularity problem, and provides a working framework in 
which to develop a more detailed analysis of the different forms of memory 
as they pertain to the individual's identity. 
The broad distinction between two kinds of mental representations -
perception-based and meaning-based - is first associated with two forms of 
memory that the individual exhibits: (I) episodic memory and (2) semantic 
memory (Tulving 1983). Within these two forms of memory there are memo-
ries that then relate to the self and memories that do not. Episodic memory 
is experiential memory, and may be either autobiographical, involving an 
individual's memories of experienced self-images, or non-autobiographical, 
involving an individual's memories of experiences that included no aware-
ness of oneself. For example, an autobiographical episodic memory is 
remembering oneself seeing a friend, while a non-autobiographical episodic 
memory is just remembering seeing a friend. Semantic memory is context-
free memory that in itself makes no reference to an experience.4 As with 
episodic memories, there are semantic memories that relate to the self, and 
thus involve an individual's self-concepts, and semantic memories that do 
not relate to self. For example, a semantic memory that relates to the self is 
remembering that one was born in a certain year, while a semantic memory 
that does not relate to oneself is remembering that Africa is a continent. 
Generally, then, cognitive psychology's self-as-memory view encompasses 
both autobiographical episodic memories that involve mental representa-
tions in the form of self-images, and semantic memories that relate to the 
self involving mental representations in the form of self-concepts. 5 
An important assumption in cognitive psychology's general theory of 
memory is that both episodic and semantic memory take the form of declar-
ative knowledge ("knowledge that"), and can always be represented by 
individuals in propositional form. Though this is not immediately obvious 
with respect to episodic memory, the standard argument is that any episodic 
memory must be representable in propositional form on the grounds that 
one cannot remember an experience unless one can remember that one has 
had that experience. At the same time, in contrast to memories that take the 
form of declarative knowledge, individuals also have memories that take the 
form of procedural knowledge ("knowledge how") that in itself is not repre-
sented propositionally (Anderson 1976). Further, whereas episodic and 
semantic memory can exhibit the self, procedural knowledge per se is thought 
not to include references to the self, as, for example, when one remembers 
that the way to operate a particular device is to follow certain instructions. 
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Nonetheless, for essentially the same reasons that episodic memory is repre-
sentable in propositional form, so procedural knowledge is thought to be 
also. That is, one cannot remember how to do something unless, at least in 
principle, one could say that such and such was how to do something. And 
when individuals exercise memories regarding procedural knowledge they 
also remember that they have certain skills and capabilities. Cognitive 
psychologists have characterized these cases as involving a kind of "meta-
knowledge," which itself is declarative or propositional in form, but whose 
object is procedural rather than declarative knowledge, as, for example, 
when one remembers one knows how to drive a car (Bandura 1977). 
These latter points gain greater meaning when their general purpose is 
made clear. Thus, by including meta-knowledge memories about one's own 
skills and capabilities along with episodic autobiographical memories and 
semantic memories involving the self as kinds of propositional declarative 
knowledge, all forms of memory somehow involving the self can be treated 
as propositional declarative knowledge. Or, as it has been influentially put, 
when we think of the self as memory, we think of the self as a knowledge 
structure (Kihlstrom and Klein 1994). This conclusion is important by virtue 
of what it excludes. Specifically, whatever cannot assume the form of propo-
sitional declarative knowledge cannot be an object of memory. For example, 
should primitive single-cell animals be conditioned to respond to certain 
stimuli, this conditioning cannot properly be termed remembering, because 
it could never take the form of propositional declarative knowledge (Bennett 
and Hacker 2003: 156). Or, should human individuals exhibit patterns of 
conditioned functioning about which they can never become conscious, 
these also cannot be properly termed remembering. This basic conclusion 
underlies the main general theory of memory in cognitive psychology, the 
generic associative network model known as the Adaptive Control of 
Thought (ACT) model (Anderson 1983), which organizes memory as a 
system of declarative knowledge, and which makes it possible to explain the 
self as a set of such memories within this framework. 
Within the general ACT framework , not surprisingly, there are competing 
models of the structure and organization of the overall memory system, and 
also, therefore, competing ACT models of the self as memory. The differ-
ences between these competing models are not important here.6 Suffice it to 
say that empirical studies in cognitive psychology that employ the self-as-
memory view attempt to support one or another model in experiments on 
well-identified phenomena such as self-reference effects (in which individuals 
engage in some sort of self-referent encoding task) or priming actions (in 
which memory paths are activated in connection with certain cues). 
Reference to these sorts of phenomena, of course, recalls research in behav-
ioral economics in terms of framing heuristics, editing, and so on, that has 
played a role in nonconventionalist approaches to individual decision-
making, and one might accordingly expect behavioral economists also to 
start from a self-as-memory view of the individual. But it appears that 
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behavioral (and experimental) economists have only begun to make use of 
the cognitive psychology approach to memory and individual identity inad-
vertently by way of other concerns. The following section thus turns to how 
elements of an account of personal identity in terms of memory show signs 
of emerging in behavioral and experimental economics in connection with 
efforts to understand recent experimental results inconsistent with standard 
economic assumptions . 
. 4 Personal identity in behavioral economics 
A surprising though now widely accepted result of recent work in the 
economics laboratory is that, contrary to what economists have believed for 
over a century, individuals do not behave in an exclusively self-interested 
manner in their economic interaction with others, but in certain specific 
circumstances consistently deviate from self-interested behavior by empha-
sizing reciprocity in their interaction with others - for example in 
competitive markets with incomplete contracts, and also in situations 
involving public goods where there are strong material incentives to free ride 
but also opportunities to punish free riders (Fehr and G chter 2000). One 
implication of this is that social context matters (or, more concretely, institu-
tions), since it appears to determine the circumstances under which one 
observes self-interested behavior or reciprocity. A second, less frequently 
noticed implication, however, is that memory also matters, because behaving 
in a reciprocal way towards others requires that individuals remember their 
past interactions with them. Thus, economists' recent empirical discovery 
that reciprocity is fundamental to certain types of economic behavior has 
opened the door to making cognitive psychologists' research on memory a 
new concern of economics. 
One good reflection of this new thinking can be found in the work of 
Vernon Smith. Though Smith is more an experimentalist than a behav-
ioralist, he shares the latters' general view (one at odds with rational choice 
theory and conventionalist theories of individual decision-making) that indi-
vidual behavior cannot be properly explained without reference to its human 
psychological foundations. Here I draw attention to his position in his 
"Experimental Methods in Economics," a contribution to the Cognitive 
Science Encyclopedia (2003), which as an encyclopedia contribution presum-
ably represents views that Smith believes should be taken as authoritative in 
economics. Much of Smith's discussion focuses on two experimental games 
whose reciprocity results have been highly replicated in the literature, the 
ultimatum game and the trust game. In interpreting what these games show, 
Smith succinctly combines the two implications of reciprocity behavior 
noted earlier as follows: "context matters because all memory involves rela-
tionships and is associative" (V. Smith 2003: 1070). Here the term 
"associative" refers to the ACT model, a reference which is further supported 
by comments Smith makes, on priming effects and on the logic of how cues 
66 Behavioral economics and identity 
trigger memories, that draw on Gazzaniga et al. (1998), a standard cognitive 
psychology source which adds elements of neuroscience to the investigation 
of memory via neuropsychological studies of brain-injured patients and 
brain-imaging studies of normal individuals. Or, more explicitly, Smith states -
echoing his oft-stated principle that institutions matter - "context is impor-
tant," specifically because of "what is known about the autobiographical 
character of memory and the interaction between current and past experi-
ence in creating memory" (V. Smith 2003: 1072). Thus he argues that 
individuals' behavior in ultimatum and trust games exhibits reciprocity 
because individuals operate in contexts that not only require they remember 
their past interactions with other players but also require that they autobio-
graphically remember these past interactions as their own experiences. 
Individuals, that is, employ what is described in cognitive psychology as 
episodic autobiographical memory in their interactions with others, and 
accordingly operate with perception-based mental representations of them-
selves, or self-images.7 Smith also asserts that the design of experiments 
provides players with "different instructional-procedurai contexts" (V. Smith 
2003: 1072). On the argument of Kihlstrom and Klein (1994), this would 
generate procedural knowledge for individuals, which, when it pertains to 
the self, could take the form of meta-knowledge which individuals could 
additionally use to state propositions to be remembered about themselves 
and games. 
Thus Smith sees a cognitive psychology understanding of memory as 
central to understanding interactive individual behavior. But he also has a 
particular view of the origins and development of this behavior which goes 
beyond a purely behavioral framework, and which draws on neuropsy-
chology and evolutionary psychology. Neuropsychologists treat the mind as 
a system of circuitry organized in interacting modules that are specialized 
for various functions, and evolutionary psychologists regard this mental 
circuitry as the product of millions of years of human evolution.8 One such 
module, Smith believes, is the "cheater-defector module" for social exchange, 
which evolutionary psychologists see as adaptive to a skill in making judg-
ments about who can and cannot be trusted among individuals with whom 
one interacts. In a laboratory ultimatum and trust games context, then, indi-
viduals employ this module when they exhibit reciprocity, so that the 
reliance on memory in social interaction has its basis in the evolution of 
human biology and psychology. Further, in a passage in an earlier draft 
version of his Cognitive Science Encyclopedia contribution - then titled 
"Experimental Methods in (Neuro) Economics" - which was omitted from 
the fmal published version, Smith speculatively suggested how one might 
connect this larger framework and its emphasis on memory to a concept of 
the self: "personal identity is defined by some combination of inherited 
mental characteristics and our developmental experience" (V. Smith n.d.: 
10). We might interpret this as saying that having a personal identity is the 
result of an evolutionary process that has reinforced the operation of our 
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mental cheater-defector module by the development of enhanced memory 
processing. Thus while reconceptualizing the self was not Smith's original 
entry point - rather it was to explain experimental evidence regarding 
reciprocity at odds with the self-interest postulate - his effort to explain these 
results nonetheless leads to an understanding of the self which departs from 
the traditional neoclassical conception that treats individuals as uninflu-
enced by context, and which integrates core cognitive psychology concerns 
in this regard with respect to the role of memory. 
Whether Smith's views will be widely adopted by other experimentalists 
and behavioralists remains to be seen, but his picture, together with the more 
fully developed account to be found in cognitive psychology, points us 
toward an alternative behavioral conception of the individual. But applying 
this understanding of identity to the individual in economics still leaves one 
essential aspect of individuals unexplained: namely their independence from 
one another. Cognitive psychology puts this issue aside, because it by 
assumption investigates the individual apart from other individuals to focus 
on individuals' mental representations per se. But mainstream economics 
concerns individuals who interact with one another in markets, and thus its 
conception of the individual needs to include not only an account of what 
individuals are, but also an explanation of how they are distinct from one 
another. In this regard, cognitive psychology may be of little help if its self-
as-memory view relies on quasi-memories which may be both the 
individual's memories and those of others the individual nonetheless 
believes to be his or her own. Indeed, cognitive psychologists have also 
developed "connectionist" models of social memory in which non-experien-
tial semantic memories are formed and shared across individuals, thus 
blurring the lines between one individual and the next, at least with respect 
to this form of memory (E. Smith et al. 1999). Thus cognitive psychology's 
view of the self does not seem to provide a sufficient basis for explaining 
individual identity in economics, and something additional is needed if 
behavioral economics is to offer an account of the individual to fill the gap 
left by neoclassicism. In the following section I argue that those who see 
neuroeconomics as a logical extension of behavioral economics may see this 
additional needed element in the existence of the human body. 
5 Neuroeconomics and identity 
Neuroeconomics, understood as the combination of neuroscience and 
behavioral economics (cf. Camerer et al. 2005), represents a strategy for 
grounding the behavioral regularities that cognitive science has established 
in brain structures. That is, the regularities in behavior we observe are 
caused by the ways in which the brain works. While this general idea has 
long been entertained, the recent development of brain-imaging technolo-
gies has now made it possible to investigate the idea more systematically. 
Thus neuroscientific research examines how different areas of the brain are 
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activated when an individual is active in different ways. Since we may 
observe individuals' memory reports just as we can observe other types of 
behavior, neuroscientists argue that in principle we should be able to link 
memory behavior to particular areas of the brain. This, then, would locate 
all an individual's memories in the individual whatever their origin, whether 
or not they are autobiographical, and irrespective of whether social memory 
models are correct. Then individuals would not be identified strictly in terms 
of their memories but rather in terms of their "embodied" memories.9 What, 
then, does this further conception of the individual involve? 
First, the relation of psychological states to brain states is fundamental to 
both the neuroeconomics conception of the individual and indeed to 
neuroeconomics itself. There are different possible views here, and I begin 
with the most radical in order to dismiss it as not reflective of behavioral 
and neuroeconomics thinking as it is currently constituted. This radical view 
is a form of reductionism termed eliminative materialism or eliminativism, 
particularly as developed by Steven Stich (1983) and_Patricia Churchland 
(1986) . Actually, eliminative materialism is not reductionist in the sense of 
reducing or translating all psychological predicates into brain predicates, 
which proponents accept cannot be done, but rather reductionist in the sense 
that it aims to remove all psychological predicates and explanations from 
science on the grounds that such "folk psychology" notions as belief, desire, 
feeling, pain, memory, and so on are fictitious entities that have no place in 
science, much as was previously learned about such now-abandoned notions 
as phlogiston, ether, and so on. 
But whatever the merits - or demerits (cf. Hacker 2001) - of eliminative 
materialism, it does not appear to reflect the goals of behavioral economists, 
who see neuroeconomics as an opportunity to reform the vocabulary of 
psychology used in economics rather than an occasion for abandoning such 
vocabulary altogether. Thus, even on the professedly "radical" interpretation 
of the neuroeconomics research program (Camerer et al. 2005), what is 
recommended is a replacement of the traditional neoclassical constructs of 
preferences and beliefs by such neuroeconomics constructs as affective 
versus cognitive processing and automatic versus controlled processing. 
These latter constructs may not be traditional folk psychology concepts, but 
neither are they concepts that may be explained purely in terms of neural 
functioning. Rather they constitute a sort of hybrid kind of concept whose 
purpose is to reconfigure the descriptions of psychological activity 
economists employ in such a way as to more closely reflect neural 
processing, and in this respect simply reflect recurrent efforts in the history 
of the field of psychology to re-specify and refine the field's categories and 
concepts. Indeed, neuroeconomic explanations of behaviors of particular 
interest in economics, such as loss aversion or hyperbolic discounting, 
remain well within the orbit of these new behavioral explanations. Thus 
neuroeconomics is clearly not a reductionist program in the strong elimina-
tivist sense. 
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Nor indeed, moreover, does neuroeconomics appear reductionist in any 
significant sense. While some proponents may be carelessly tempted to suggest 
that psychological states can be translated into brain states, the program as a 
whole seems more committed to showing that brain states underlie psycho-
logical states, so as to be able to provide a more secure grounding to 
evidence regarding psychological regularities. Thus I suggest that the stan-
dard view among proponents of neuroeconomics is that psychological states 
are supervenient on brain states, meaning that psychological states depend 
on brain states but are not reducible to them, just as is widely argued in the 
case of other science-science relations such as biology and chemistry. 
Alternatively, psychological states are emergent upon brain states in the 
sense that they exhibit characteristics that cannot be ascribed to their associ-
ated brain states. That is, as in many other fields that have developed at the 
point of intersection between existing sciences, neuroeconomics as the 
combination of economics and neuroscience seems destined to adopt the 
widely held view of the relative autonomy of related sciences. lo 
Second, then, at issue is whether the body as the location of memories 
secures independence and personal identity for individuals. Here the chal-
lenge is more significant, though I will argue that what is at stake in this case 
is how one chooses to proceed in further expanding this conception rather 
than whether that conception fails altogether. Indeed, the question of 
whether the body secures personal identity has been extensively debated by 
philosophers in connection with a series of provocative thought experiments 
concerning brain transplants (one person's brain in another person's body), 
fission or split-brain transplant cases (one brain divided and transplanted 
into two bodies), brain fusion cases (distinct brains combined in one body), 
and teletransporter cases (bodies destroyed and identically rematerialized 
elsewhere).ll All of these cases challenge the basic idea that one individual is 
indeed one individual by imagining improbable but conceivable circum-
stances in which the person becomes two persons or the reverse. The effect 
of their discussion on philosophers, it seems fair to say, has been to lead many 
to conclude that no definitive view of personal identity is likely possible. 
Perhaps most representative of this consensus is Derek Parfit (1984), whose 
own view of the individual - a brain-based psychological continuity theory -
fairly closely matches the behavioral economics-neuroeconomics conception 
of the individual. Thus here I briefly describe his view in order to comment 
on the status of that conception. 
Parfit's teletransporter cases are designed to violate identity while leaving 
in its place a weaker form of connectedness for individuals across change.l2 
Were it possible for an individual to be destroyed and a perfect replica of 
that individual created elsewhere, our usual intuition is that the replica is not 
us - identity does not hold - but that we nonetheless have more interest in 
that replica of ourselves than in an entirely different individual. Parfit terms 
our replicas our descendent selves, and argues that in the absence of 
personal survival or personal identity proper we still care about the survival 
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of our descendent selves. In effect, Parfit's approach is a second-best-type 
strategy in that he gives up personal identity to place a lesser substitute in its 
place. On the one hand, this reflects philosophers' general skepticism about 
whether an adequate account of personal identity is possible, while, on the 
other hand, it reflects increasingly realistic dilemmas modem medical science 
may soon encounter regarding human identity. These same issues, however, 
also arise for the neuroeconomics conception of the individual, since its 
addition of the brain (from neuroscience) to the self-as-memory account 
(from cognitive science) leaves it in the same situation Parfit and others 
describe, where changes in the bodily basis for being an independent indi-
vidual inevitably raise questions regarding the continuing independence and 
identity of that individual. Thus the neuroeconomics conception, at least as 
currently developed, also arguably fails to account for personal identity. 
This all may strike some as a rather unsatisfactory resolution of the iden-
tity issue on the grounds that the effect of Parfit's arguments is to essentially 
drop the issue of individuals having a personal identity. Yet from another 
perspective Partit's arguments carry a more positive message, since they 
could also be interpreted to mean that the brain-based psychological conti-
nuity conception of the self is only incomplete - not necessarily mistaken -
as an account of personal identity. That is, if we suppose, as seems reason-
able, that some account of identity needs to be supplied for particular 
domains of social investigation such as economics or the law, but that we 
cannot guarantee personal identity in the abstract, we might go on to adopt 
assumptions specific to those domains that effectively "close" our account of 
identity, recognizing that any such account is relative to the purposes for 
which it is developed, and thus is more on the order of a contingent account 
of identity, not a solution to the "pure" problem of personal identity. In the 
brief fmal section, then, I sketch such a strategy for conceptions of the indi-
vidual in economics, in order to indicate how the neuroeconomics 
conception of the individual might yet provide a partial basis for thinking 
about the individual in economics. 
6 Social psychology's social interactionist perspective 
What Parfit's arguments challenge is the numerical identity assumption 
underlying personal identity, namely that an individual is one and the same 
person across change. Another way of capturing this idea of numerical iden-
tity is to say that individuals remain distinct and independent of one another 
across change - what may be understood as a matter of being able to indi-
viduate persons (Davis 2003). Consider, then, the different sorts of strategies 
that might be used to individuate persons. One could first reason in terms of 
properties of individuals per se, and attempt to show that certain properties 
successfully distinguish particular individuals from one another. This route 
is taken by neoclassicism that emphasizes individuals' subjectivity, and takes 
individuals to be distinct in virtue of each having their own individual 
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subjective states. The behavioral econonomics-neuroeconomics conception 
also takes this route when it makes individuals' memories necessarily their 
own in virtue of their location in independent brains. However, both 
accounts fail as means of individuating persons - the neoclassical concep-
tion in virtue of its circularity problems and the neuroeconomics conception 
in virtue of Parfit-type problems. Thus we need to consider an alternative 
strategy for establishing individuation. 
In this case, rather than reason from the properties of individuals per se, 
we might ask whether the independence and distinctness of individuals is a 
function of individuals' interaction with one another. Arguably this is the 
general view in social psychology, which in contrast to cognitive psychology 
begins from the assumption that individuals' psychological states must be 
understood socially. On this view, roughly speaking, individuals occupy 
different positions, the occupation of which distinguishes them vis- -vis one 
another. This is not the place to examine the adequacy of this strategy, and 
accordingly I restrict myself to linking this idea to the notion that identity 
conceptions may be "completed" relative to fields of investigation in which 
they operate. Taking economics and law, then, as social interactionist types 
of investigation, both may be said to invest agents with certain capacities -
the capacity to choose and trade in economics and the capacity to act as a 
legal and moral agent in law. Such capacities can be said to distinguish indi-
viduals from one another as independent beings, because both economics 
and the law presuppose that these capacities are independently exercised in 
the ideal case. Supposing individuals have such capacities, then, does not 
solve the "pure" problem of personal identity. But were societies in fact to be 
organized according to economic and legal systems meant to ensure that 
individuals generally had such capacities, then individuals would effectively 
have personal identities understood in part in terms of those capacities and 
in part in terms of whatever substantive conceptions of individuals were 
employed (such as, for example, a brain-based psychological continuity theory). 
In this case, having a personal identity is a contingent matter reflecting how 
societies are organized, and not something that can be said to hold apart 
from any and all social-historical circumstances. 
From this perspective, the emerging behavioral economics-neuroeco-
nomics conception of the individual receives a mixed evaluation. On the one 
hand, since it draws on the first individuation strategy described earlier, it 
can ultimately no more provide a fully satisfactory account of personal iden-
tity than can Parfit. But, on the other hand, since the cognitive psychology 
foundations of this conception are not necessarily incompatible with the 
social interactionist perspective of social psychology, the door is still open to 
enlarging this conception in such a way as to provide an understanding of 
how individuals conceived in the first instance in terms of memories and 
brains might have personal identities in social settings. Further discussion of 
these strategies for a "social embedding" of the identity of the individual, 
however, must be postponed to another occasion. 
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Notes 
I The author is grateful to Barbara Montero, Mark White, and the participants of 
the 2004 Amsterdam-Cachan History and Methodology of Economics Workshop 
for co=ents on a previous version of this chapter. 
2 In this respect they recalled Herbert Simon's earlier, neglected approach. See Sent 
(2004) for a comparison of the origins and nature of the "old" and "new" behav-
ioral economics. 
3 Thus one might have been told about an experience one does not remember, and 
subsequently come to believe one remembers it. 
4 Though one may remember the experience of learning a semantic memory, as a 
semantic memory it can be remembered independently of the experience of 
learning it. 
5 For a substantially similar but nonetheless slightly different classification of 
forms of memory from the perspective of philosophy, see the pioneering discus-
sion of Norman Malcolm (1963). 
6 A key difference is whether a memory item is stored independently of other 
memory items, as in the independent storage model, or whether there are groupings 
and clusterings of memory items, as in hierarchical organization models (Kihlstrom 
and Klein 1994). Note that it is important to take the term "'storage" metaphorically. 
7 This is not to say that Smith thinks non-autobiographical episodic and semantic 
memory are not involved in games. Surely they are. He simply does not employ 
these additional categories in emphasizing players' reliance on experiential 
memory. 
8 Smith refers to the often-cited Cosmides and Tooby (1992) for this argument. 
9 A precursor view is that of philosopher Sydney Shoemaker, who thought Locke's 
memory argument for identity presupposed the body, so that the memory crite-
rion for identity depends on bodily continuity (Shoemaker 1984). 
\0 See Dupr (2001) for a defense of this view. 
II Locke actually considered the mind transplant case in his prince-cobbler 
example. His memory-as-identity definition led him to conclude that the prince 
was still the prince with his mind in the body of the cobbler, and vice versa. The 
fission and fusion cases are due to Wiggins (1967); Parfit (1984) develops the 
teletransporter case. 
12 Similar conclusions arguably follow from the fission and other cases. 
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